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ABSTRACT 
 
This  paper  examines  the  extent  to  which  Muslims  are  integrated  in  Western  societies  by 
comparing their experiences in the United States and Europe.  It utilizes and assesses country-
level data, such as public opinion polls, figures on discrimination, and data on participation in 
society, in order to draw comparisons between these two regions.  First, integration debates and 
approaches  are  reviewed  in  order  to  provide  a  framework  for  comparison.    Second,  public 
opinion  surveys  are  interpreted  to  see  how  factors  affecting  the  Muslim  community  differ 
between the United States and Europe.  Third, the United States and United Kingdom - countries 
that both espouse multiculturalism - are used as case studies to see how Muslim integration 
compares over time and in relation to the general public.  Findings suggest that the inclusion of 
Muslims  in  U.S.  society  has  been  more  successful  on  the  whole,  while  European  countries 
continue to struggle with eliminating large differences between the Muslim community and the 
general public.  Moreover, Muslims in the United States seem to face less discrimination than 
other  minorities,  and  their  experience  appears  to  be  improving  over  time.    In  contrast, 
discrimination  against  Muslims  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  more  severe  than  other  religious 
groups, and seems to be remaining constant. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Muslim  integration  into  Western  societies  has  become  of  increasing  importance  to 
policymakers and researchers since 9/11.  The idea that exclusion of Muslim communities from 
mainstream society threatens international security has gained particular currency in Europe as a 
result of attacks in Amsterdam, Madrid, and London and riots in Paris.  That most of those 
involved in these terrorist incidents were European citizens of Asian or African descent brought 
many to question integration and immigration policies and the extent to which these policies can 
foil a future “homegrown” attack. 
  Terrorism in Europe has prompted several researchers to examine Muslim integration in 
the West (Haddad and Smith 2002; Malik 2004a; Angenendt et al. 2007; Sinno 2009).  Yet these 
studies tend to concentrate on integration within individual countries rather than in cross-national 
comparison.  A notable exception is Cesari (2004), but her study underscores the transformation 
and reconciliation of Islam in the West, rather than the extent to which Muslims are included into 
Western  societies.  In  contrast,  Schain‟s  (2009)  analysis  focuses  specifically  on  Muslim  
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integration and provides a useful critique of how France, Britain, and the United States “manage 
difference” in national policies.  Some have exclusively researched integration in Europe (Malik 
2004b; Nielsen 2004; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Klausen 2005; Tausch et al. 2007; Israeli 2008).  
Others have looked at the U.S. case (Hasan 2000; Abdul-Ghafur 2005; Cateura 2005; Verbrugge 
2005; McCloud 2006).  Though these studies provide rich descriptions of the Muslim experience 
in these respective regions, they do not elicit insight gleaned from transatlantic perspective. 
  In  this  study,  I  aim  to  contribute  to research  on  Muslim  integration  by  employing  a 
comparative case study analysis to observe how integration differs between the United States and 
Europe.  I operationalize integration by considering opinions of Muslims and the general public, 
figures  on  discrimination,  and  data  on  participation  in  society,  such  as  education  and 
employment.  Much of this analysis focuses on providing interpretation of open-source data that 
allows for two types of comparison.  First, some data allow for direct comparison between the 
United States and Europe and usually come from transatlantic public opinion surveys.  Second, 
other data allow for analysis of Muslim integration within a specific country over time or in 
relation to the general public or another minority group.  This approach standardizes the way in 
which  comparison  between  two  countries  can  be  achieved.    Some  academic  research,  like 
Cateura‟s  Voices  of  American  Muslims,  and  governmental  reports,  such  as  the  European 
Monitoring  Centre  on  Racism  and  Xenophobia‟s  “Perceptions  of  Discrimination  and 
Islamophobia,”  provide  detail  on  discrimination  against  Muslims,  but  do  not  put  this 
discrimination in context by establishing a point of reference.  It is true that Muslims in the West 
face discrimination, but to what extent?  How does Muslim integration in Europe and the United 
States differ?  
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  This paper proceeds as  follows.   First, I consider debates and approaches relating to 
integration  in order to provide a  framework for studying the Muslim  experience.  Second, I 
analyze the results of a series of Pew surveys in order to make general comments on the extent to 
which Muslims are included in U.S. and European societies.  Third, I specifically examine the 
cases of Muslim integration in the United States and the United Kingdom by examining opinion 
surveys, incidents of discrimination, and levels of access to society.  This approach allows the 
two states to be compared systematically.  Finally, I conclude by offering three key observations 
on integration in the United States and Europe. 
 
INTEGRATION DEBATES AND APPROACHES 
Angenendt  (2007)  identifies  three  debates  that  underscore  the  relationship  between 
immigration, integration, and security as they relate to the Islamic challenge in Europe.  They are 
particularly useful in contextualizing the transatlantic comparison of Muslim integration. 
  The first debate links immigration to terrorism (Angenendt 2007).  This is an association 
that Chebel d‟Appollonia and Reich (2008) refer to as the “securitization of immigration.”  The 
9/11 attacks highlighted vulnerabilities in the U.S. border control apparatus and demonstrated 
that  terrorists  could  circumvent  the  immigration  system.  Thus,  the  United  States  made 
immigration a key component in its post-9/11 counterterrorism policy.  The connection between 
immigration  and  security  became  clear  when  the  responsibilities  of  the  Immigration  and 
Naturalization Service (INS) were transferred to the newly established Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).  Some Europeans have followed the U.S. lead, resulting in what many refer to 
as “Fortress Europe.”  For example, as the gateway between North Africa and Europe, Spain has 
implemented more restrictive immigration policies to control the flow of immigrants, especially  
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since  the  2004  Madrid  bombings.    Those  that  subscribe  to  this  debate  argue  that  tough 
immigration policies can mitigate the risk of terrorism. 
  The  second  debate  centers  on  how  Islam  is  changing  Europe‟s  “cultural  security” 
(Angenendt 2007).  Some argue that the increasing presence of Muslims in Europe is eroding the 
conventional European ethos, pointing to Denmark and Turkey as illustrations.  In Denmark, the 
provocative  depictions  of  Mohammed  in  2005  and  politician  Geert  Wilders‟  incessant  anti-
Islamic  diatribes  exemplify  tensions  between  the  Muslim  community  and  Danish  society.  
Though these views may be the exception rather than the rule, Denmark also struggles with 
aspects  of  Islamic  culture,  including  arranged  marriages  and  wearing  the  hijab.    Moreover, 
Turkey‟s accession to the European Union is another point of contention.  Some do not want to 
see Turkey become European, insisting that Europe is a “Christian club.”  Austria‟s opposition to 
Turkey‟s accession is widely believed to be rooted, at least in part, in Islamophobia.  For some 
Europeans, Jimenez (2008) argues, “the possibility of 70 million Turkish, mainly Muslim, people 
becoming part of the EU poses a cultural threat.” 
  The third debate cuts between the first two arguments and highlights the marginalization 
that some Muslims experience while living in Europe (Angenendt 2007).  The logic follows that 
disenfranchisement leads to anger, which induces acts of aggression and violence.  The London 
bombings in 2005 and the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004  – both 
homegrown terrorist incidents – lead some to believe that exclusion from mainstream society 
breeds Islamist militancy.  Robert Leiken (2005), from the Nixon Center, for example, endorses 
this belief in his contentious Foreign Affairs article, “Europe‟s Angry Muslims.”  He affirms, 
“As a consequence of demography, history, ideology, and policy, western Europe now plays host 
to  often  disconsolate  Muslim  offspring,  who  are  its  citizens  in  name  but  not  culturally  or  
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socially.”  Similarly, Shore (2006) contends that Europe is “breeding bin Ladens.”  Proponents 
argue that the way to prevent terrorism is by constructing effective social integration policy and 
promoting participation in public life. 
  The United States and Europe generally agree that integrating Muslims is necessary in its 
own  right  in  order  to  increase  satisfaction  and  social  capital  among  Muslim  populations, 
regardless of whether social exclusion  breeds terrorism.  But approaches to integration  have 
varied  considerably  across  the  West.    The  more  common  policies  include  assimilation, 
multiculturalism,  and  guest  worker  programs,  and  each  adopts  different  goals  and  produces 
varying results. 
  France  espouses  assimilation.    This  is  marked  by  laïcité  and  republicanism,  which 
establish a strong separation between church and state, guarantee citizens the right to express 
their faith, but exclude religion from public policy (Gallis et al. 2005).  Schain (2009, 5-6) argues 
that France extends neither privilege nor protection to ethnic and religious groups.  As such, 
France does not adhere to quota systems or affirmative action, believing that equal rights foster 
equal opportunity (Gallis et al. 2005).  For example, the government prohibits Muslim girls from 
wearing the hijāb in schools (with few exceptions) and maintains no state-funded Islamic schools 
(Fetzer and Soper 2005).  Though religious diversity is encouraged outside the public sphere, all 
are expected to learn French and adopt French values. 
  Contrary to the French model, Britain has advocated multiculturalism, which promotes 
“tolerance and  integration while allowing  immigrants and ethnic groups to maintain cultural 
identities and customs” (Gallis et al. 2005, 12).  This approach fosters recognition of British 
norms  and  values,  but  encourages  the  preservation  of  personal  culture  and  advocates  anti-
discrimination.  Individualism, diversity, and group membership are equally stressed  in  both  
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private and public  life.   Similarly, the United States has promoted  multiculturalism.  Schain 
(2009, 32) observes that multiculturalism in the United States developed out of the civil rights 
movement and race relations in the 1960s, which shaped integration of immigrant communities 
by “providing a strong, pro-active national anti-discrimination structure.”  Contrary to the United 
Kingdom,  in  the  United  States,  diversity  is  not  always  appreciated,  but  is  common,  while 
tolerance is not always granted, but is expected. 
  Guest worker programs became widespread across Europe after the Second World War 
when reconstruction was necessary, economies were strong, but labor was scarce.  Immigrants 
traveled to Europe to fill labor shortages, but were required to return home after a few years.  In 
this  sense,  guest  worker  programs  did  not  have  a  strong  integration  component  because 
immigrants were never meant to live in European societies permanently.  The Turkish population 
in Germany is illustrative.  Laurence (2007, 62) notes: 
German leaders would  be  well advised to  concentrate on the practical concerns that undermine social 
cohesion: political alienation, overzealous policing, and socioeconomic inequality.  Germans‟ caution at 
embracing Turks as a minority community and insistence on rupture with the home country were often 
perceived as indifference; politicians‟ repeated criticism of „parallel societies‟ did nothing to eliminate their 
existence.    The  fundamental  problems  of  Turkish  Germans  and  other  Muslims  are  rooted  in 
disenfranchisement, social discrimination, and the lack of economic and political integration, not religion. 
 
For years, Germany did not engage its Turkish minority, refusing to address problems that arose 
from these co-existing societies.  Though recent attempts aim to alleviate this effect, problems 
from this dual society persist. 
Minkenberg (2008) has constructed a typology to help capture the relationship between 
countries‟ immigration and integration approaches (Table 1).  Although it is based on policies of 
the  1990s,  his  analysis  remains  useful  today.    France‟s  immigration  policies,  for  example, 
continue  to  be  more  open  in  comparison  to  other  European  countries  like  Denmark  and 
Germany.  Yet its level of cultural integration remains low in contrast to Britain and the United 
States.    This  is  not  surprising  since  its  strategy  has  encouraged  assimilation  and  prohibited  
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special rights for religious groups.  Moreover, Denmark continues to impose strict limitations on 
immigration.  For example, in the 2007 election, the Danish People‟s Party, which advocates 
tight restrictions on immigration, took 13.8% of the vote, remaining the third largest party in 
Denmark. 
  However, 9/11 and subsequent terrorist incidents challenge how consistent this typology 
continues to be.  France has recently begun to debate positive discrimination approaches and has 
reached  out  to  the  Muslim  community  by  spearheading  the  Conseil  Français  du  Culte 
Musulman.    Moreover,  the  U.S.  immigration  stance  has  toughened  since  9/11  and  all 
immigration  services  have  been  folded  into  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  lending 
support to the idea that immigration has been securitized.  In comparison, Britain has added civic 
integration dimensions to its multiculturalism approach since the 7/7 London bombings, and the 
Muslim Council of Britain  in particular  has  become essential  in establishing communication 
between  the  Muslim  community  and  government  in  recent  years.    Finally,  Germany‟s 
immigration  policies  traditionally  have  been  restrictive,  but  recent  efforts  have  aimed  to 
moderate them, especially toward the Turkish population. 
 
THE MUSLIM EXPERIENCE IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Understanding  Muslim  integration  in  the  context  of  a  specific  country  has  been  the 
primary focus for those interested in the subject.  However, comparing the Muslim experience in 
a cross-national study is equally important since it offers a frame of reference for evaluating 
integration.  Over the years, the Pew Research Center has provided public survey data that offers 
insight  into  Muslim  integration  in  both  the  United  States  and  Europe.    Surveys  ask  for 
perspectives  from  Muslim  communities  and  the  general  public  and  information  on  social  
9 
 
inclusion factors, such as income.  As suggested by the data, Muslims seem to better integrated 
in the United States than Europe. 
  Table 2 provides information on Muslim populations in the United States and Europe.  In 
comparison, the Muslim presence is much lower in the United States.  The difference between 
the United States and France is especially stark (under 1% compared to nearly 10%).  Population 
differences can be explained by the massive immigration movement that took place during the 
post-war European reconstruction effort where nationals of former European colonies (mostly 
Muslim) traveled to Europe to provide labor.  Immigrants included Turks to Germany, Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis to Britain, Algerians to France, and Moroccans to France and Spain.  Many of 
these immigrants chose to stay permanently and had children who developed a Muslim-European 
identity.  Peach (2007) provides a helpful illustration of immigration to Europe (below).  The 
United States, in contrast, did not undergo a similar influx in Muslim immigration.   
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U.S. and European views on Muslims are presented in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6.  Americans 
believe that Muslims aim to adopt  national customs  much  more than Europeans do.  In the 
United States, less than half of the public believes that Muslims want to be distinct from society, 
which differs significantly from the view in Europe.  Approximately two-thirds of Britons and 
Spaniards and three-fourths of Germans believe that Muslims want to be separate from society.  
This may be the result of larger and more noticeable Muslim populations.  Moreover, the trend is 
similar when observing how Americans and Europeans view their relations with Muslims.  The 
United States is more likely to see relations as strong than European countries are (France is the 
exception) and less apt to see relations as poor.  This seems to suggest that the Muslim and non-
Muslim communities in the United States have better interactions than in Europe.  Furthermore, 
Europeans generally view Muslims more negatively than Americans do.  In 2008, less than one 
quarter of Americans held unfavorable views toward Muslims.  The rate is double in Germany 
and Spain.  What is also striking is that since 2004, attitudes in the United States have improved 
toward  Muslims  (31%  unfavorable  to  23%  unfavorable)  while  those  in  all  four  European 
countries have deteriorated.  Finally, most European countries view growing Islamic identity as 
“bad,”  especially  in  Spain  (82%),  Germany  (83%),  and  France  (87%).  This  seems  to  lend 
support to the debates about integration - that Islam threatens traditional and cultural views of 
security in Europe. 
  The way in which Muslims perceive their identity varies between the United States and 
Europe as well as among European states.  Public impressions of Muslims may be instructive in 
determining the extent to which Muslims identify with their respective national cultures.  Tables 
7 and 8 show figures on Muslim identity.  Although U.S. Muslims believe that being devoutly  
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Muslim conflicts with living in modern society more than French or Spanish Muslims, they are 
less likely to hold this view compared to British or German Muslims.  This may indicate that 
Muslims in Britain and Germany have not reconciled Islamic and national identities to the extent 
that others  have.    Moreover,  Spanish,  German,  and  British  Muslims  think  of  themselves  as 
Muslims “first” and then as members of their respective countries.  The trend is reversed in the 
United States and France.  Muslims in these two countries identify themselves with their country 
“first” and then as Muslim.  In the United States, differences across religions - as well as race - 
are  common,  which  may  explain  why  Muslims  primarily  relate  to  the  country.    Contrarily, 
France‟s policy of assimilation mitigates differences by refusing to recognize religious factors in 
public life, which may actually produce a similar outcome experienced in the United States.  
Finally, Muslims in the United States and Britain are more likely to be concerned about Islamic 
extremism.  This  is  not surprising  since policies  against Islamist extremism  have  been  most 
prominent there. 
  Public  perceptions  on  the  Muslim  community  help  to  identify  the  extent  to  which 
Muslims are included in their communities.  How Muslims compare to the general public in 
terms of earned income is also important because it speaks beyond discrimination and to active 
participation  in society.  Table 9  compares  income  levels  between Muslims and the general 
public in the United States and Europe.  As can be seen, income levels are most even in the 
United States across all three income categories; the lack of difference is actually remarkable.  
On the whole, Muslims earn as much as the public in the United States.  In contrast, income 
levels are not highly unequal in Europe.  In Germany, the public earns more than twice as much 
as Muslims in the highest bracket; in Spain, more than four times.  Although income disparity is 
most striking in Germany and Spain, it also exists in France and Britain.  Approximately 20%  
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more  Muslims  in  France  and  Britain  fall  into  the  lowest  income  bracket  compared  to their 
respective  publics.  Disparities  in  income  levels  seem  to  highlight  the  difference  between 
Muslims  and  the  public  in  Europe,  perpetuating  Muslim  exclusion  and  reinforcing  negative 
stereotypes of Muslims and mainstream society. 
  Schain (2009) offers a heuristic to understand the successes and failures that countries 
have had in overall integration (Table 10).  Although it does not exclusively do so, his analysis 
can be applied to the Muslim experience.  He claims that the United States has achieved success 
in  both  “cultural  and  value”  and  “socio-economic”  integration.    The  United  Kingdom,  he 
contends,  has  achieved  success  in  socio-economic  integration,  but  not  cultural  and  value 
integration.  He posits that the opposite is true for France, and that the Netherlands has failed at 
both.    Though  these  observations  are  fairly  reliable,  they  are  not  without  complications.  
Muslims in Britain and France have equally faced economic challenges, especially in obtaining 
access to incomes comparable to the public.  Moreover, more French than British share concerns 
with the growing Islamic identity, which may hinder France‟s progress in cultural and value 
integration.  Nonetheless, comparing Muslim integration between the United States and Europe 
as considered in terms of public opinion and income levels points to the conclusion that the U.S. 
Muslim integration experience has so far been more successful. 
 
UNITED STATES AND MUSLIM INTEGRATION 
The Muslim population is much smaller in the United States than in Europe, making up 
less than 1% of the total population.  In Europe, it ranges between 2.3% and 9.6%, depending on 
the state.  But what does the Muslim population look like in the United States?  Tables 11, 12, 
and 13 provide some descriptions.  Most are first-generation immigrants arriving primarily from  
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the Arab region or South Asia, and particularly from Iran or Pakistan.  Others are U.S. citizens, 
but children or grandchildren of immigrants.  Most first-generation Muslims immigrated to the 
United States in the 1990s and 2000s.  Despite the fact that two-thirds of Muslims in the United 
States come from other countries, three-fourths are U.S. citizens. 
  Notable differences between U.S. Muslims and the general public are age and race.  Over 
half of U.S. Muslims are under 39 compared to only 40% of the public.  13% are over 55 in 
relation to 30% of the public.  It is evident that many U.S. Muslims are young, especially in 
comparison to the public.  Moreover, racial compositions between Muslims and the public also 
differ.  There are twice as  many  Whites  in the general public than the Muslim community.  
Accordingly, there are over twice as many Blacks and four times as many Asians in the Muslim 
population than the general public.  Moreover, the majority of native-born Muslims are Black.  
These figures show that the Muslim community in the United States is much more diverse than 
the general public in terms of racial composition. 
  The  comparison  between  the  United  States  and  Europe  in  the  second  section  gives 
indication that Muslims are more integrated into U.S. society.  Here, I hope to provide additional 
insight into the U.S. Muslim experience by considering integration over time, in relation to other 
minority groups, in terms of access to societal  goods, and as perceived by  both the Muslim 
community and the general public.  This should give more meaning and richness to the nature of 
Muslim integration in the United States. 
  An appropriate starting point is to compare incidents of discrimination over time and 
across  minority groups.  Table 14 shows the  number of  incidents of discrimination  that the 
Muslim, Black, Jewish, male homosexual, and Hispanic communities  experienced from 2001 
through 2007.  These figures are reported to the FBI by law enforcement agencies.  As such, they  
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are  undoubtedly  under-representative  of  all  discriminatory  acts.    However,  they  should  be 
consistently underreported across time and minority groups, which allows for a fairly accurate 
comparison.  Muslims experienced fewer incidents per year among all groups, which is to be 
expected since they are the smallest of the five minority groups.  The number of anti-Islamic 
incidents in 2001 compared to subsequent years is particularly noteworthy.  In 2001, nearly 500 
incidents were reported, compared to only 155 in 2002.  However, the hostile response that the 
Muslim community faced directly after 9/11 helps to explain why so many incidents occurred in 
2001.  Although  discrimination  decreased  for  all  groups  over  the  time  period,  it  was  most 
pronounced  for  the  Muslim  community,  which  fell  by  76%.    Even  if  2001  is  considered 
anomalous (because of 9/11), anti-Islamic discrimination still decreased by 26% from 2002 to 
2007.  Over the same period, discrimination against male homosexuals decreased by only 6%, 
while all other forms of discrimination actually increased.  This may indicate that the situation 
for Muslims is improving, while discrimination against other groups is decreasing or remaining 
fairly constant. 
  Pew provides additional information about how Muslim Americans compare specifically 
to African Americans in terms of discrimination (Table 15).  Survey respondents were asked to 
report  if  they  felt  like  they  were  treated  or  viewed  with  suspicion,  called  offensive  names, 
singled out by police, physically attacked or threatened, or mistreated by any combination of 
these four.  In all five categories, the Muslim community fared better.  Nearly 10% of Muslims 
felt like they had been singled out by the police - the rate is double for the African American 
community.    Only  one  quarter  of  Muslims  experienced  suspicion  compared  to  one  third  of 
African Americans.  On average, it seems that Muslims suffer less discrimination than African 
Americans, at least as reported by this study.  One explanation may be that there are simply more  
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African Americans than Muslims in the United States and that their higher visibility attracts 
more attention, including racism. 
  Table 16 provides figures on how the American public views Muslims and how it views 
Muslim Americans.  Most Americans hold a more favorable opinion of Muslim Americans than 
Muslims (53% compared to 43%).  This may indicate that Americans view Muslim Americans 
as  more  integrated  or  less  extreme  than  Muslims  in  general  or  that  Americans  know  more 
Muslim Americans than Muslims, thereby, viewing them more favorably. 
  Aside from discrimination and public opinion, integration can be measured by the degree 
to  which  Muslims  participate  in  society,  especially  in  terms  of  education,  employment,  and 
household income (Table 17).  By and large, education levels between the general public and 
Muslim community are comparable.  In fact, although the differences are small, more Muslims 
have high school degrees as well as some graduate education in relation to the general public.  
Employment rates are also similar, although more of the general public is employed full-time.  
Finally, household income levels between the public and Muslim population are even, differing 
only by 1% in the top four brackets and 2% in the bottom.  These figures suggest that levels of 
participation in society are similar between the Muslim community and general public.  
  Muslims‟  perspectives  on  life  in  the  United  States  may  be  the  best  indication  of 
integration because they encapsulate the tradeoff between advantages and setbacks.  Table 18 
gives details on  how U.S. Muslims  view a range of  issues compared to the public.    Views 
between the groups are similar.  Although the public rates its communities, personal financial 
situations,  and  happiness  higher  than  the  Muslim  community,  these  differences  are  small.  
Moreover, more Muslims believe that they can get ahead with hard work than the general public  
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and  also  feel  more  satisfied  with  the  status of  the  United  States.    Despite  small  degrees  of 
variation, Muslims‟ viewpoints are relatively in line with the public. 
  Evaluating data points to the conclusion that the Muslim experience in the United States 
seems to be improving over time (or at least remaining constant) and that Muslims may be better 
integrated than other minority groups, especially since 9/11.  Undoubtedly, some Muslims feel 
discrimination and alienation, but as a community, their situations appear comparable to those of 
mainstream society. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM AND MUSLIM INTEGRATION 
The United Kingdom has a large Islamic population (Table 19).  After Christians and 
nonbelievers, Muslims  make up the biggest religious community  in the country, constituting 
approximately 3% of the general public in England and Wales.  Moreover, like in the United 
States, the Muslim community is young (Table 20).  Over half of the Muslim population in 
England and Wales is 24 or younger.  An approximate one third is between 25 and 49.  Only 
11% of  the  Muslim  population  is  50  or older.    89% of  the  Muslim  population  is  under  50 
compared to only 66% of the general public.  Furthermore, Table 21 provides information about 
ethnicities of the Muslim population in England and Wales.  Nearly three-fourths of the Muslim 
population is Asian.  Of this group, most are Pakistani (58%), Bangladeshi (23%), or Indian 
(12%).  This is not surprising given Britain‟s former rule over South Asia and that many South 
Asians relocated to Britain after the Second World War to fill labor demands.  In contrast, the 
number of Muslims that are White or Black is much smaller. 
  According  to  data,  discrimination  in  the  United  Kingdom  seems  to  be  worsening.  
Although  the  United  Kingdom  Home  Office  -  the  department  responsible  for  immigration,  
17 
 
counterterrorism,  and  police  -  does  not  specifically  report  on  anti-Islamic  incidents  of 
discrimination,  it  does  provide  information  on  racially  and  religiously  aggravated  incidents 
(Table 22).  Figures suggest xenophobia is on the rise in England and Wales.  In 2001-02, the 
number of incidents recorded by the police reached almost 15,000.  This escalated to nearly 
26,500 by 2007-08 - an increase of 77% over six years. 
  In  contrast  to  the  Home  Office,  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service  (CPS)  does  provide 
specific information on Muslim victimization.  The CPS is the governmental department that is 
responsible  for  public  prosecution  of  people  charged  with  criminal  offenses  in  England  and 
Wales.  In its annual reports, it provides information about the religious orientation of crime 
victims.  Table 23 gives figures on the number of victims of religiously aggravated incidents in 
England and Wales from 2004-05 through 2006-07.  Though the percentage of victims that are 
Muslim  appears  to  be  remaining  stable  across  time,  it  is  by  far  the  largest  of  all  religious 
victimization.  For example, in 2006-07, the number of Muslim victims comprised 63% of all 
victims  harassed  because  of  their  religion  and  74% of  all  victims  harassed  because  of  their 
religion in cases when their religion was indeed known.  This seems to suggest that harassment is 
directed toward Muslims far more than any other religious group. 
  Discrimination is only one facet of integration and cannot capture the Muslim experience 
in  the  United  Kingdom  alone.    Like  in  the  U.S.  case,  participation  in  society  must  also  be 
considered.  Tables 24, 25, and 26 provide insight into the extent to which Muslims are socially 
included in their environment by considering access to education, employment, and healthcare.  
Across all ages, Muslims have fewer educational qualifications than the general public.  The 
differences  are  striking.    One  third  of  Muslims  between  25  and  34  have  no  educational 
qualifications.  This is three times as large as the general public in the same age range.  47% of  
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Muslims between 35 and 49 have no qualifications, compared to only 22% in the general public.  
Nearly three-fourths of Muslims between 65 and 74 have no skills, compared to 63% of the 
general public.  These statistics clearly indicate that the Muslim community does not have the 
same opportunity to education as the general public does. 
  Economic activity rates also vary substantially between Muslims and the public.  Only 
half of Muslim males between 16 and 24 are economically active in relation to 68% of the wider 
society.  70% of Muslim males over 25 are economically active, but this is still 5% lower than 
the public.  Muslim female rates are considerably lower in both age brackets, but this should be 
expected in light of Islamic traditions that affect a Muslim woman‟s economic activity, such as 
obtaining permission from her male guardian to work and maintaining her commitment to the 
family.  Moreover, unemployment rates in England and Wales are much higher for Muslims.  
Nearly one in five Muslim males between 16 and 24 are unemployed – this is 8% higher than the 
wider society.  The rate is lower for Muslim males over 25, but it is still approximately three 
times higher than the general public.  16% of Muslim females between 16 and 24 and 14% of 
those over 25 are unemployed.  These rates are much higher  in relation to the public.  It is 
important to note that although a low economic activity rate for Muslim females is expected 
given  the  propensity  for  many  Muslim  women  to  stay  at  home  to  raise  their  families,  the 
unemployment rate shows that for Muslim women who do want to work, access to employment 
is much more difficult. 
  Finally, how Muslims rank in comparison with the general public on “limiting long-term 
illness” provides  indication on the extent to which they  enjoy adequate health.  The United 
Kingdom‟s Office of National Statistics defines this illness as “A self assessment of whether or 
not a person has a limiting long-term illness, health problem or disability which limits their daily  
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activities or the work they can do, including problems that are due to old age.”  Across all age 
brackets,  more  Muslims  have  limiting  long-term  illnesses  than  the  general  public.  The 
difference is most stark in the 50-64 and 65+ brackets.  However, this should be considered in 
context.  Many older Muslims in the United Kingdom were born in other countries, such as 
Pakistan and Bangladesh; therefore, their illnesses are most likely a result of health deficiencies 
faced there, rather than in the United Kingdom.  That the number of Muslims under 49 with 
limiting long-term illnesses is comparable to that of the general public suggests that younger 
Muslims face no more threats to their health than the society at large. 
  In short, the Muslim experience in the United Kingdom is poor.  Muslims face prejudice 
more than other religious groups and confront severe barriers to integration, such as obstacles to 
education and employment opportunities.  Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
situation is improving over time.   
 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
Placing  Muslim  integration  in  transatlantic  perspective  generates  some  preliminary 
findings.  First, in general, the United States seems to fare better with integrating Muslims in 
comparison to Europe.  Fewer Americans view Muslims negatively or as trying to be distinct 
from society.  More Americans view the growth of Islamic identity positively than Europeans do.  
And only the image of Muslims in the United States has improved over the past few years.  In his 
observation, Barrett (2007, 77) comments, “Overall, the immigrant Muslims of Western Europe 
have remained poorer, less educated, and more socially marginalized.”  This may be a result of 
the capability of U.S. Muslims to reconcile their religious beliefs with American culture.  The 
Council of American-Islamic Relations (2006, 4) observes, “New Muslim thinkers are provoking  
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debate and counter arguments, often leading to renewed understanding of Islam‟s congruence 
with modernity.  More and more Muslims in America are thus being better able [to] balance 
between the demands of their faith and the challenges of modernity.”  U.S. Muslims seem to be 
achieving  more  success  in  striking  a  balance  between  their  religious  identities  and  national 
expectations. 
  Second,  despite  different  approaches  to  integration, the  United  States  and  France  are 
similar in a couple of ways.  The U.S. and French publics equally believe that relations between 
Muslims and Westerners are “good.”  Moreover, roughly the same percentages of Muslims in the 
United States and France view themselves as Muslim first and then as a part of U.S. or French 
society.  This is most likely a result of successful multiculturalism in the United States and the 
minimization  of  religious  differences  in  the  French  public  arena.    In  the  United  States, 
differences are common and thought to be celebrated.  In France, they are underestimated and 
often disregarded.  This approach contrasts to the British case  in which differences  between 
Muslims and the wider society are blatant and often antagonistic. 
  Third, and more specifically, Muslim integration seems to have been more successful in 
the  United  States  than  the  United  Kingdom.    Muslims  face  less  discrimination  than  other 
minorities and there is evidence that the situation is actually improving over time.  In general, 
Muslims have similar levels of access to societal needs, such as education and employment, as 
the  wider  U.S.  public.  Contrarily,  discrimination  against  Muslims  in  Britain  is  high  and 
remaining constant.  There is a large difference between Muslims and the public in terms of 
educational qualifications and employment, although health (at least measured as limiting long-
term illness) is similar between younger Muslims and Britons.  
21 
 
  The  impact of post-colonial  immigration on Europe helps to explain why the  United 
States and Europe differ in their experiences with Muslim integration.   In ways, Europe has 
much more to address as it finds its way in effectively embracing its large Muslim communities.  
It is unfair to say that the U.S. approach toward Muslims has been so much more effective in 
achieving integration, but the platform  for participation that women, African Americans, and 
other groups that have experienced marginalization has made it much easier.  This is not to say 
that the United States should carry on with the status quo.  The government should not condone 
the  need  to  construct  a  coherent  integration  policy  because  it  believes  that  the  traditions  of 
diversity and expected tolerance preclude it.  In contrast, Europe must continue to amend its 
concept of identity.  This is necessary because when Muslims become an integral constituent of 
European  culture,  they  will  be  more  represented  in  national  policy.    Current  trends  suggest 
immigration to Europe in the future will unlikely decrease, and second- and third-generation 
Muslims  will  continue  to  face  challenges  reconciling  traditional  European  values  with  the 
customs of the countries from which their parents and grandparents came.  As such, policy at 
both the EU and national levels must persist in meeting the needs of Muslim communities.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Open United States
Australia          
Canada                  
New Zealand 
Netherlands 
Sweden
Restrictive Switzerland
Austria         
Denmark      
Germany         
Norway
Moderate
France              
Ireland             
Portugal
Belgium              
Great Britain 
Finland                        
Italy                     
Spain
Table 1
Typology of Immigration and Cultural Integration Policies, 1990s
Immigration 
Policies
Cultural Integration
(Religious and Cultural Group Rights)
Low Medium High
 
Source: Michael Minkenberg. (2008). “Religious Legacies and the Politics of Multiculturalism: A Comparative 
Analysis of Integration Policies in Western Democracies.” In Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and 
Europe in Comparative Perspective. Ariane Chebel d‟Appollonia and Simon Reich (eds). Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. p. 53. 
 
 
 
%
United States 0.6
United Kingdom 2.8
France 8 - 9.6
Spain 2.3
Germany 3.6
Denmark 5
Austria 4.1
Table 2
Muslim Populations in the 
United States and Europe
 
Sources: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 10.; BBC 
News. (2005). “Muslims in Europe: Country guide.” 
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Generally Good Generally Bad
% %
United States 32 55
Great Britain 28 61
France 33 66
Spain 14 61
Germany 23 70
Table 3
Relations between Muslims and Westerners
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2006). “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other.” Pew 
Global Attitudes Project. 
 
 
 
 
Muslims in your country mostly want to . . .
% %
United States 44 33
Great Britain 64 22
France 53 46
Spain 67 21
Germany 76 17
Table 4
Views on Society and National Customs
be distinct from 
society
adopt 
national 
customs
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2006). “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and 
Cultural Identity.” Pew Global Attitudes Project. 
 
 
 
 
2004 2008
% %
United States 31 23
Great Britain 18 23
France 29 38
Spain   37* 52
Germany 46 50
*Figure from 2005
Table 5
Unfavorable Views of Muslims
 
 Source: Pew Research Center. (2008). “Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe.” Pew 
Global Attitudes Project.  
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Is growing Islamic identity good or bad?
Good Bad
% %
United States 37 46
Great Britain 27 59
France 11 87
Spain 13 82
Germany 11 83
Table 6
Views on Islamic Identity
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2006). “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and 
Cultural Identity.” Pew Global Attitudes Project. 
 
 
 
 
% % %
U.S. Muslims 32 63 5
British Muslims 47 49 4
French Muslims 28 72 0
Spanish Muslims 25 71 4
German Muslims 36 57 7
Table 7
Islamic Identity and Modern Life
Is there a conflict in being a devout Muslim and living in 
modern society?
Yes No Don't Know / 
Refused
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 32.  
 
 
 
 
% %
United States 47 51
Great Britain 81 52
France 46 35
Spain 66 29
Germany 69 29
Table 8
Islamic Identity and Extremism
Think of Self As 
Muslim First
Very Concerned 
about Islamic 
Extremism
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 3. 
  
28 
 
United States % %
$75,000+ 26 28
$30,000 - $74,999 39 39
< $30,000 35 33
Great Britain
£40,000+ 13 23
£20,000-£39,999 26 38
< £20,000 61 39
France
€29,500+ 20 32
€17,500-€29,499 35 41
< €17,500 45 27
Spain
€21,500+ 7 26
€14,500-€21,499 20 24
< €14,500 73 50
Germany
€30,000+ 12 26
€18,000-€29,999 35 39
< €18,000 53 35
Table 9
Income Levels in United States and Europe
Muslim
General 
Public
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 19. 
 
Netherlands -
Table 10
Two Dimensions of Integration Success / Failure
Success in Cultural and Value Integration
+ -
United States United Kingdom +
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France
 
Source: Schain, Martin A. (2009). “Managing Difference: the Success and Failure of Integration Policy in France, 
Britain, and the United States.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. New 
York, NY. p. 44. 
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Generation % Country of Birth (Cont'd) %
First 65 Lebanon 4
Second 7 Yemen 4
Third 28 Bangladesh 3
Iraq 3
Born in . . . Bosnia & Herzegovina 3
United States 35
Arab Region 24 Year of Arrival
South Asia 18 2000-2007 18
Iran 8 1990-1999 21
Europe 5 1980-1989 15
Other Africa 4 1979 and Earlier 11
Other 6 Native Born 35
Country of Birth U.S. Citizen
Pakistan 8 Yes 77
Iran 8 No 23
India 4
Table 11
U.S. Muslims: Generation, Location of Birth, Arrival Year, and U.S. Citizenship
U.S. 
Muslims
U.S. 
Muslims
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 15. 
 
% %
Male 54 48
Female 46 52
18-29 30 21
30-39 26 19
40-54 31 30
55+ 13 30
Married 60 57
Divorced 6 11
Separated 3 2
Widowed 3 6
Never Married 28 24
Table 12
U.S. Muslims: Gender, Age, and 
Family Status
U.S. 
Muslims
General 
Public
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 16.  
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% % % %
White 38 44 31 77
Black 26 10 56 11
Asian 20 28 2 5
Other/Mixed 16 18 11 7
Table 13
U.S. Muslims: Racial Composition
Race
U.S. Muslims General 
Public
Total
Foreign 
Born
Native 
Born
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 17. 
 
 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Anti-Islamic 481 155 149 156 128 156 115
Anti-Black 2899 2486 2548 2731 2630 2640 2658
Anti-Jewish 1043 931 927 954 848 967 969
Anti-Male Homosexual 980 825 783 738 621 747 772
Anti-Hispanic 597 480 426 475 522 576 595
Table 14
Incidents of Discrimination against Select Minority Groups, 2001-2007
 
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2001-2007). “Hate Crime Statistics.” Annual Reports. 
 
 
 
 
% %
Treated or Viewed with Suspicion 26 33
Called Offensive Names 15 20
Singled Out by Police 9 20
Physically Attacked or Threatened 4 10
Any of the Above Four 33 46
Table 15
Encounters with Intolerance
Muslim 
Americans
African 
Americans
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 38. 
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Favorable Unfavorable No Opinion
Views of Muslims % % %
August 2007 43 35 22
March 2002 47 29 24
Views of Muslim Americans
August 2007 53 29 18
Table 16
Views of Muslims and Muslim Americans
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Benedict XVI Viewed Favorably but Faulted on Religious Outreach, Public 
Expresses Mixed Views of Islam, Mormonism.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education % %
Graduate Study 10 9
College Graduate 14 16
Some College 23 29
High School Graduate 32 30
Not High School Graduate 21 16
Employment
Employed Full-Time 41 49
Employed Part-Time 16 11
Not Employed 43 40
Household Income
$100,000+ 16 17
$75,000 - $99,999 10 11
$50,000 - $74,999 15 16
$30,000 - $49,999 24 23
Less than $30,000 35 33
Table 17
Education, Employment, and Income
U.S. 
Muslims
U.S. 
General 
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 18-19. 
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American Work Ethic % %
Can Get Ahead with Hard Work 71 64
Hard Work Is No Guarantee of Success 26 33
Neither / Don't Know 3 3
Rate Your Community
Excellent / Good 72 82
Fair / Poor 27 18
Don't Know / Refused 1 --
Personal Financial Situation
Excellent / Good 42 49
Fair / Poor 52 50
Don't Know / Refused 6 1
Satisfied with State of United States
Satisfied 38 32
Dissatisfied 54 61
Don't Know / Refused 8 7
Would You Say You Are . . .
Very Happy 24 36
Pretty Happy 54 51
Not Too Happy 18 12
Don't Know / Refused 4 1
Table 18
Views on Life in United States
U.S. 
Muslims
U.S 
General 
 
Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” p. 2. 
 
Religion Number % Number % Number %
Muslim 1,524,887 3% 21,739 1% 1,546,626 3%
Christian 35,251,244 72% 2,087,242 72% 37,338,486 72%
Buddhism 139,046 0% 5,407 0% 144,453 0%
Hindu 546,982 1% 5,439 0% 552,421 1%
Jewish 257,671 1% 2,256 0% 259,927 0%
Sikh 327,343 1% 2,015 0% 329,358 1%
Any Other Religion 143,811 0% 6,909 0% 150,720 0%
No Religion 7,171,332 15% 537,935 19% 7,709,267 15%
Religion Not Stated 3,776,515 8% 234,143 8% 4,010,658 8%
TOTAL 49,138,831 100% 2,903,085 100% 52,041,916 100%
Table 19
Population of England and Wales by Religion
England Wales England and Wales
 
Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). “Census 2001.” Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009.  Table 
S103.  
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Age Number % Number %
0-15 522,860 34% 10,488,736 20%
16-24 281,624 18% 5,677,802 11%
25-49 567,182 37% 18,464,534 35%
50-59 81,944 5% 6,553,316 13%
60-64 36,510 2% 2,544,754 5%
65-74 42,850 3% 4,367,032 8%
74+ 13,652 1% 3,945,742 8%
TOTAL 1,546,622 100% 52,041,916 100%
Table 20
Muslim Population in England and Wales by Age
Muslim General Public
 
Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). “Census 2001.” Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009.  Table 
S103. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnicity Number %
White 179,773 12%
Mixed 64,262 4%
Asian 1,139,065 74%
Indian 131,662 12%
Pakistani 657,680 58%
Bangladeshi 259,710 23%
Other 90,013 8%
Black or Black British 106,345 7%
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group 57,181 4%
TOTAL 1,546,626 100%
Table 21
Ethnicity of Muslims in England and Wales
 
Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). “Census 2001.” Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009.  Table 
S104. 
 
 
 
 
2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008
14,975 16,910 20,975 23,363 26,605 28,485 26,495
Table 22
Incidents of Racially or Religiously Aggravated Harassment in England and Wales
 
Source: Kershaw, Chris, Sian Nicholas, and Alison Walker (eds). (2008). “Crime in England and Wales 2007/08: 
Findings from the British Crime Survey and Police Recorded Crime.” Home Office. Table 2.04. p. 46. 
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Number
% of All 
Cases
% Where 
Religion 
Is Known
Number
% of All 
Cases
% Where 
Religion 
Is Known
Number
% of All 
Cases
% Where 
Religion 
Is Known
Religion**
Muslim 23 68% 77% 18 42% 82% 17 63% 74%
Christian 4 12% 13% 3 7% 14% 3 11% 13%
Sikh 0 0% 0% 1 2% 5% 1 4% 4%
Hindu 2 6% 7% 0 0% 0% 0 0% 0%
Mormon  1 3% 3% 0 0% 0% 0 0% 0%
Buddhist 0 0% 0% 0 0% 0% -- -- --
Jewish -- -- -- -- -- -- 2 7% 9%
Unknown 4 12% N/A 21 49% N/A 4 15% N/A
TOTAL 34 100% 100% 43 100% 100% 27 100% 100%
*As Prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service.
**Religion Represents Victim's Actual or Perceived Religion.
Table 23
Victims of Religiously Aggravated Incidents in England and Wales*
2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007
Sources: Crown Prosecution Service. (2006). “Racist and Religious Incident Monitoring.” Annual Report 2005-
2006. Management Information Branch; Crown Prosecution Service. (2007). “Racist and Religious Incident 
Monitoring.” Annual Report 2006-2007. Management Information Branch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age Number % Number %
16-24 61,373 22% 901,267 16%
25-34 101,651 35% 928,265 13%
35-49 128,738 47% 2,389,522 22%
50-59 43,608 53% 2,587,051 39%
60-64 23,631 65% 1,365,523 54%
65-74 31,136 73% 2,765,414 63%
Table 24
Muslims with No Educational Qualifications in England and Wales by Age
Muslim General Public
 
Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). “Census 2001.” Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009.  Table 
S158. 
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Number % Number % Number % Number %
Economically Active
Muslim 69,370 49% 268,026 70% 51,133 36% 99,263 29%
General Public 1,948,330 68% 11,707,975 75% 1,741,871 62% 9,624,025 59%
Unemployed
Muslim 12,964 19% 36,593 14% 8,106 16% 13,752 14%
General Public 206,965 11% 587,242 5% 119,753 7% 347,382 4%
Table 25
Economic Activity of Muslims in England and Wales by Gender and Age
Male Female
16-24 25+ 16-24 25+
Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). “Census 2001.” Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009.  Table 
S153. 
 
 
 
 
 
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Muslim 522,860 5% 848,810 4% 118,454 1% 56,502 1% 1,546,626 3%
General Public 10,488,735 100% 24,142,336 100% 9,098,068 100% 8,312,775 100% 52,041,914 100%
With Limited Long-Term Illness
Muslim 24,578 5% 98,239 12% 54,614 46% 35,079 62% 212,510 14%
General Public 451,162 4% 2,327,268 10% 2,421,527 27% 4,284,900 52% 9,484,857 18%
Table 26
Health of Muslims in England and Wales by Age
0-15 16-49 50-64 65+ Total
Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). “Census 2001.” Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009.  Table 
S152. 
 
 
 
 